Profiling and Automated Decision Making in the Present and New EU Data Protection Frameworks by Savin, Andrej
1	
	
Profiling and Automated Decision Making in the Present 
and New EU Data Protection Frameworks 
Andrej	Savin*	
	
Introduction 
	
	
The	 digital	world	 of	 the	 21st	 century	 is	 increasingly	 the	world	 of	 automatic	
decision	making.	In	such	a	world,	an	ever	larger	number	of	tasks	are	relegated	
to	 computers	 which	 gather	 and	 process	 data	 as	 well	 as	 suggest	 or	 make	
decisions	 silently	 and	with	 little	 supervision.	 This	 situation	 has	 been	made	
possible	by	a	transfer	of	a	staggering	portion	of	our	daily	lives	from	the	offline	
world	 to	 the	 Internet.	 It	 is	 a	 truism	 that	 automation	 would	 be	 impossible	
without	our	willing	participation	on	the	Internet.	We	freely	take	part	in	social	
networks,	post	on	blogs,	and	send	our	emails.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	equally	
true	 that	 we	 are	 increasingly	monitored	 by	 the	 state,	 by	 profit‐maximizing	
corporations	and	by	our	fellow	citizens	and	that	these	methods	of	monitoring	
are	 becoming	 smarter.	 Vast	 amounts	 of	 data	 which	 have	 become	 available	
and	which	we	 contribute,	 form	what	we	 today	 call	 “big	 data”.1	This	 is	 then	
harvested	 for	 connections	 and	 correlations	 and	profiles	 created	 that	 can	be	
used	 for	 commercial	 and	 other	 purposes.	 We	 fear	 this	 world	 but	 are	 also	
dependant	on	it.	The	creation	of	these	profiles	and	their	usage	is	an	uncharted	
territory	 for	 the	 social	 sciences	 as	much	 as	 it	 is	 a	 strange	 territory	 for	 the	
regulators.		
	
Although	 often	 labelled	 “profiling”,	 there	 are	 at	 least	 separate	 phenomena	
which	are	 frequently	but	 erroneously	used	 concurrently.	Profiling	generally	
means	 extrapolation	 of	 information	 on	 the	 Internet	 by	 the	 process	 of	
computer‐generated	information	gathering	and	subsequent	construction	and	
application	of	profiles.2	Automated	decision	making,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	
general	ability	to	make	decisions	based	on	the	generated	profiles	but	without	
human	actors	.	The	difference	lies	in	the	fact	that	automated	decision	making	
is	 the	 process	 of	 reaching	 a	 decision	 (business,	 administrative,	 baking,	 etc.)	
based	on	the	already	created	profile.	In	other	words,	a	large	collection	of	data	
is	used	as	a	source	for	creating	a	profile	which	is	then	put	to	use	and	on	the	
basis	of	which	a	decision	 is	made.	Decisions	can,	however,	 also	be	made	by	
humans	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 very	 same	 profiles	 that	 machines	 use.	 Smart	
surveillance,3		 on	 the	other	hand,	normally	 refers	 to	 a	 sub‐set	of	 automated	
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1	Data	 of	 very	 large	 size	 and	 complexity	 that	 cannot	 be	 manipulated	 with	 usual	 database	
management	tools.	For	an	overview	see	Viktor	Mayer‐Schonberger	and	Kenneth	Cukier,	Big	
Data:	A	Revolution	That	Will	Transform	How	We	Live,	Work	and	Think	 (London:	 John	Murray,	
2013)	
2	On	 the	 complexities	 of	 profiling	 in	 the	 EU	 see	 Mireille	 Hildebrandt	 and	 Serge	 Gutwirth	
(editors).	Profiling	the	European	Citizen	(Springer,	2008)	
3	Smart	surveillance,	which	is	only	indirectly	dealt	with	in	this	paper,	is	currently	a	subject	of	
comprehensive	 studies	 funded	 through	 EU	 Seventh	 Framework	 Programme.	 While	 the	
SMART	 Project	 is	 a	 broad	 study	 of	 automated	 recognition	 technologies	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	
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decision	 making	 where	 individuals,	 companies	 and	 states	 use	 surveillance	
technologies	 (such	 as	 CCTVs,	 social	 networks,	 RFID	 and	 geo‐tagging	
information,	 financial	 data)	 to	 gather	 information,	 create	 profiles	 and	make	
decision	based	on	them.		
	
Profiling	has	been	recognized	as	a	problem	in	the	Article	29	Data	Protection	
Working	 Party	 (Article	 29	 WP).4	A	 definition	 was	 proposed	 saying	 that	
profiling		
	
means	 any	 form	 of	 automated	 processing	 of	 personal	 data,	 intended	 to	 analyse	 or	
predict	 the	 personality	 or	 certain	 personal	 aspects	 relating	 to	 a	 natural	 person,	 in	
particular	 the	 analysis	 and	 prediction	 of	 the	 person’s	 health,	 economic	 situation,	
performance	 at	 work,	 personal	 preferences	 or	 interests,	 reliability	 or	 	 behaviour,	
location	or	movements.		
	
	
Three	important	points	will	be	apparent	from	the	aforesaid.	The	first	 is	that	
profiling	(gathering	of	data	and	forming	profiles	based	on	this	data)	has	the	
potential	to	be	harmful	even	if	no	decisions	are	made	on	the	basis	of	profiles.	
This	is	because	the	potential	of	this	data	to	be	harvested	for	information	and	
its	 commercial	 value.	 Second,	 automated	 decision	 making	 is	 a	 much	 wider	
term	than	smart	surveillance.	A	database	of	banking	data	may	serve	as	a	basis	
for	 decision	 on	 the	 customers’	 credit	 rating	 without	 any	 surveillance	
techniques	 being	 employed.	 Third,	 smart	 surveillance	 or	 smart	 decision	
making	may	be	particularly	sensitive	due	to	data	subject’s	lack	of	awareness	
that	data	are	collected	and	used.5	
	
Both	automated	decision	making	in	general	and	smart	surveillance	as	one	of	
its	aspects	introduce	a	level	of	convenience	and	a	level	of	risk.		Both	are	useful	
and	 dangerous	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Both	 are	 controversial.	 In	 2014,	 both	 are	
ubiquitous.	 The	 risk	 has	 two	 faces.	 One	 is	 primarily	 economic	 –	 a	 subject	
fearful	of	monitoring	will	not	easily	share	information	and	will	not	avail	itself	
of	information	society	services.	The	second	is	social	and	it	has	to	do	with	our	
feeling	 that	 being	 monitored	 is	 morally	 and	 socially	 wrong.	 The	 public	 is	
aware	 of	 the	 potential	 negative	 sides	 with	 the	 European	 Barometer	 2011	
study	 demonstrating	 that	 74%	 of	 Europeans	 desire	 the	 ability	 to	 give	 or	
refuse	consent	before	collection	or	processing	for	online	profiling	purposes.6		
																																																																																																																																																								
RESPECT	Project	 looks	 at	 convenient	 and	 cost‐effective	 surveillance.	 Scalable	Measures	 for	
Automated	 Recognition	 Technologies	 (SMART),	 Project	 No.	 261727,	 2011‐2014.	 Rules,	
Expectations	 &	 Security	 through	 Privacy‐Enhanced	 Convenient	 Technologies	 (RESPECT),	
Project	No.	285582,	2012‐2105.	
4	Advice	paper	on	essential	elements	of	a	definition	and	a	provision	on	profiling	within	the	EU	
General	Data	Protection	Regulation,	adopted	on	13	May	2013	
5	Although	the	assumption	that	other	data	are	less	harmful	simply	because	the	subject	had	in	
one	 form	 or	 another	 “consented”	 to	 their	 use	 is	 questionable.	 For	 more	 details	 on	 the	
meaning	 and	 effect	 of	 consent	 online	 see	 EU	 FP7	 project	 Consumer	 sentiment	 regarding	
privacy	on	user	 generated	 content	 services	 in	 the	digital	 economy	 (CONSENT),	 Project	No.	
244643,	2010‐2013	
6	European	 Commission,	 Special	 Eurobarometer	 359,	 "Attitudes	 on	 Data	 Protection	 and	
Electronic	 Identity	 in	 the	 European	 Union",	 	 June	 2011,	 pp.	 74‐75,	 available	 at	
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf		
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The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	give	a	short	overview	of	the	present	EU	legal	
framework	for	automated	decision	making	and	to	provide	a	brief	analysis	of	
the	 current	proposals	 for	 reform.	 In	 the	 first	part	 ,	we	will	 look	at	 the	Data	
Protection	 Directive 7 	and	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 Recommendation	 on	
Profiling.8	In	 the	 second	 part,	 we	 will	 analyse	 the	 proposed	 General	 Data	
Protection	 Regulation.9	In	 the	 final	 part,	 we	 will	 propose	 some	 general	
directions	for	the	lawmakers.	
	
	
Data Protection Directive 
	
The	Data	Protection	Directive	is	the	general	instrument	on	privacy	protection	
in	the	EU.	It	applies	to	collection	of	personal	data	except	data	concerning	legal	
persons,	data	for	purely	personal	purposes	or	public	or	national	security	and	
defence.	Its	basic	premise	is	that	data	can	be	collected	and	processed	if	one	of	
the	prerequisites	in	Article	7	has	been	fulfilled.	The	main	but	not	the	only	one	
is	data	subject’s	consent.	The	others	refer	to	situation	where	data	processing	
is	necessary.	
	
There	is	little	doubt	that	data	protection	rules	apply	to	creation	of	profiles	in	
any	situation	where	data	used	is	personal	data.	There	seems	to	be	compelling	
evidence	 that	 they	also	apply	 in	cases	where	data	 is	anonymized,	 i.e.	where	
data	 previously	 gathered	 about	 an	 identified	 or	 identifiable	 person	 had	 the	
identifying	 information	 removed.10	This	 is	 because	 Article	 2(b)	 emphasises	
that	processing	includes	“erasure	or	destruction”	of	information.		
	
	
The	 first	 relevant	 provision	 of	 the	 Directive	 refers	 to	 right	 of	 access	 to	
information.	Among	other	things,	it	provides	that	data	subjects	shall	have	the	
right	to	obtain	“knowledge	of	the	logic	involved	in	any	automatic	processing	
of	data.”	Special	emphasis	is	put	on	automated	decisions	referred	to	in	Article	
15	(1)	(see	below)	which	should	be	interpreted	as	meaning	that	data	subjects	
always	have	the	right	to	know	the	logic	but	this	needs	to	be	explained	to	them	
in	particular	in	cases	where	there	is	automated	decision	making	involved.		
	
																																																								
7	Directive	95/46/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council	of	24	October	1995	on	the	
protection	 of	 individuals	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 processing	 of	 personal	 data	 and	 on	 the	 free	
movement	of	such	data,	OJ	L	281,	23.11.1995.	d	
8	Recommendation	CM/Rec(2010)13	of	the	Committee	of	Ministers	to	member	states	on	the	
protection	of	individuals	with	regard	to	automatic	processing	of	personal	data	in	the	context	
of	profiling,	23	November	2010	
9	Proposal	for	a	Regulation	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	the	protection	of	
individuals	with	regard	to	the	processing	of	personal	data	and	on	the	free	movement	of	such	
data	(General	Data	Protection	Regulation),	COM(2012)	11	final,	25.1.2011.	
10	See	 Wim	 Schreurs,	 ”Cogitas,	 Ergo	 Sum.	 The	 Role	 of	 Data	 Protection	 Law	 and	 Non‐
discrimination	Law	in	Group	Profiling	in	the	Private	Sector”	in	Profiling	the	European	Citizen,	
(ed.)	Mireille	Hildebrandt	and	Serge	Gutwirth	(Springer,	2008),	p.	249	
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The	 key	 provision	 dealing	 with	 automated	 data	 processing	 is	 Article	 15,	
entitled	“Automated	Individual	Decisions”.		The	first	paragraph	of	the	Article	
grants	 the	 right	 of	 every	 person	 not	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 decision	 “which	
produces	 legal	effect”	or	“significantly	affects”	and	which	is	“based	solely	on	
automated	processing	of	data”.	The	paragraph	specifically	mentions	that	data	
needs	 to	 be	 intended	 to	 “evaluate”	 personal	 aspects	 and,	 by	 way	 of	 an	
example	 mentions	 performance	 at	 work,	 creditworthiness,	 reliability	 and	
conduct	but	leaves	the	list	open.		
	
Article	15(1)	applies,	 therefore,	only	 to	situations	which	produce	significant	
or	 legal	 effect	 (the	 assumption	 being	 that	 legal	 effect	 is	 by	 default	 of	 some	
significance).	An	automated	decision	by	a	bank	not	to	grant	credit	falls	under	
the	provision	as	 it	produces	significant	 (although	usually	not	 legal)	effect.	A	
decision	by	a	local	council	to	classify	a	property	as	falling	under	a	particular	
tax	regime	falls	under	the	provision	due	to	its	legal	effect.	A	decision	by	a	local	
sports	club’s	computer	system	that	a	member	is	more	likely	to	be	interested	
in	 football	 than	basketball	 and	 should,	 therefore,	 receive	 updates	 about	 the	
former	produces	neither	legal	nor	significant	effects.		
	
If	the	intention	is	not	to	evaluate	personal	aspects,	the	article	does	not	apply.	
The	key	 to	application	of	 the	article	 is	 the	 intention	understood	as	 the	data	
processor’s	 awareness	 of	 and	 desire	 to	 analyse	 personal	 information.	 If	
personal	 information	 analysis	 is	 not	 the	 intended	 but	 ancillary	 effect,	 the	
article	would	not	apply.	An	example	could	be	found	in	a	number	of	situations	
where	surveillance	of	public	spaces	(real	or	virtual)	attempts	to	find	patterns	
of	 public	 behaviour	 but	 gathers	 personal	 information	 (photos,	 addressed,	
etc.)	in	the	course	of	that	activity.		A	local	council	system	monitoring	whether	
public	 parking	 spaces	 are	 full	 could	 gather	 registration	 numbers	 in	 the	
process	and	forward	them	to	other	departments	which	may	be	in	the	position	
of	making	a	decision	(e.g.	issue	parking	fines).	This	is	not	an	ideal	solution.	It	
is	 submitted	here	 that	 intention	 should	not	 form	part	 of	 the	 provision.	 The	
individual	 should	 be	 able	 to	 object	 to	 automatic	 decision	making	 based	 on	
personal	data	whether	 the	data	controller’s	 intention	had	originally	been	 to	
analyse	such	data	or	not.	
	
Article	15(1)	does	not	demand	consent	in	the	meaning	of	Article	7.	The	data	
originally	obtained	may	have	been	so	on	the	basis	of	data	subject’s	consent	or	
any	of	 the	other	bases.	The	obligation	 imposed	 is	 only	 to	 grant	 the	 right	 to	
prevent	 automatic	 decisions	 being	 made	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 data	 otherwise	
legitimately	obtained.	The	original	consent,	 if	required,	would	therefore	still	
be	 valid	 for	 the	 ordinary	 data	 processing	 that	 does	 not	 involve	 automated	
decisions.	If	data	were	originally	obtained	by	consent,	for	instance	because	a	
user	agreed	to	terms	and	conditions	on	a	website,	withdrawal	of	the	consent	
automatically	delegitimizes	the	data.	
	
In	derogation	 to	 the	 first	paragraph,	automated	decisions	may,	according	 to	
Article	15(2)	be	taken	in	the	course	of	the	entering	into	or	performance	of	a	
contract.	The	condition	in	both	situations	is	that	data	controller	can	produce	a	
log	demonstrating	that	the	data	subject	had	himself	initiated	the	contract	or,	
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in	the	alternative,	that	“there	are	suitable	measures	to	safeguard	his	legitimate	
interests”.	By	way	of	example	for	the	latter,	“arrangements	allowing	him	to	put	
his	point	of	view”	have	been	quoted.	Whereas	the	first	option	is	there	simply	
to	ensure	that	a	subject,	who	willingly	enters	into	a	contract	and	transfers	in	
the	process	some	private	information,	must	then	expect	that	such	information	
will	 be	 used,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 second	 condition	 here	 is	 puzzling.	 It	 would	
seem	that	 it	means	that	data	subjects	can	voice	their	objections	prior	 to	any	
decision	being	made.		
	
The	second	derogation	exists	in	cases	authorized	by	law,	provided	that	such	
laws	“safeguard	the	data	subject’s	legitimate	interests.”		
	
A	 difference	 has	 been	made	 above	 between	 profiling	 and	 decision‐making.	
Profiling,	 it	 will	 be	 recollected	 involves	 a	 computer‐assisted	 search	 for	
patterns	 that	 help	 arrive	 at	 conjectures	 which,	 in	 turn,	 help	 form	 profiles.	
Decision	 making,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 involves	 making	 choices/conclusions	
based	on	profiles.	Article	15	of	the	Directive	in	its	present	form	applies	to	“a	
decision”.	In	other	words,	it	applies	to	profile	application	–	not	profile	making.	
Whereas	 original	 drafts	 of	 the	 Directive	 had	 the	 same	 solution,	 original	
proposal	 for	 Directive	 on	 telecommunications	 privacy11	had	 not.12	Article	
4(2)	of	that	proposal	(though	not	of	the	final	Directive)	specifically	provides	
that	 “the	 telecommunications	organization	shall	not	use	such	data	 to	 set	up	
electronic	 profiles	 of	 the	 subscribers	 or	 classifications	 of	 individual	
subscribers	by	category.”		
	
The	 result	 of	 this	position	 is	 that	profile	creation	 is,	 by	default,	 allowed	but	
that	 persons	 who	 are	 unhappy	 with	 the	 profile	 being	 used	 for	 automated	
decision	making	may	object	according	to	Article	15.	There	are	several	reasons	
why	 this	 situation	 is	 not	 ideal.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 profiles,	 which	 play	 an	
increasingly	 important	 commercial	 role	 and	 are	 treated	 as	 commodities	 by	
modern	 companies,	 contain	 a	 significant	 potential	 for	 privacy	 violation	
irrespective	 of	 whose	 hands	 they	 are	 in.	 Data	 mining	 (computer‐aided	
extraction	 of	 useful	 information	 from	 the	 Internet)	 and	 data	 aggregation	
(combining	 data	 from	 several	 sources)	 can	 constantly	 improve	 profiles	 and	
increase	their	commercial	value.	An	example	can	be	found	in	common	social	
networking	 sites.	A	public	profile	 (i.e.	 a	profile	being	displayed	 to	a	general	
public	 and	 not	 just	 to	 “friends”)	 is	 available	 to	 anyone	 who	 browses	 on	 a	
social	 network.	 The	 same	 profile	 can	 easily	 be	 connected	 to	 other	 social	
networking	sites	(containing	photos,	blog	posts,	etc).	In	fact,	users	themselves	
often	volunteer	 this	 information.	Contractual	consent	has,	presumably,	been	
obtained	from	the	original	poster	for	each	of	the	sites	used.	It	 is	not	clear	in	
the	 present	 regime	 whether	 such	 consent	 extends	 to	 profiles	 created	 by	
aggregation	 information	 obtained	 in	 the	 previous	 ones.	 If	 a	 hypothetical	
																																																								
11	Proposal	for	a	Council	Directive	concerning	the	protection	of	personal	data	and	privacy	in	
the	 context	 of	 public	 digital	 telecommunications	 networks,	 in	 particular	 the	 Integrated	
Services	Digital	Network	 (ISDN)	and	public	digital	mobile	networks	 (COM(90)	314	 final	—	
SYN	288,	13.9.1990)	
12	Lee	 Bygrave,	 “Minding	 the	 Machine:	 Article	 15	 of	 the	 EC	 Data	 Protection	 Directive	 and	
Automated	Profiling”,	Computer	Law	and	Security	Reporter	7	(2000)	67‐76	
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aggregator	 obtains	 such	 information	 by	 means	 of	 automatic	 computerized	
search	 and	 then	displays	 it,	 the	original	 contractual	 consent	 for	 each	 of	 the	
sites	 would	 not	 seem	 to	 cover	 the	 aggregator.	 Such	 aggregator	 would	
inevitably	 be	 both	 the	 processor	 and	 the	 controller	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	
Article	2	of	the	Directive.	Furthermore,	pursuant	to	Article	6	of	the	Directive,	
personal	data	can	only	be	processed	in	a	fair	and	lawful	way	and	for	specified,	
explicit	 and	 legitimate	 purposes.	 It	 can	 reasonably	 be	 assumed	 that	 an	
aggregator/profiler	which	gathers	data	in	this	way	will	fall	foul	of	some	of	the	
criteria	of	“purpose	limitation”	in	Article	6.	
	
It	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	 add	 here	 that	 data	 processed	 in	 police	 and	 judicial	
matters	 fall	 under	 a	 separate	 regime.13	The	 2008	 Framework	 Decision	
prohibits	automated	individual	decisions	in	the	manner	similar	to	Directive.	It	
is	 only	 allowed	 if	 authorised	 by	 a	 law	 which	 also	 lays	 down	 safeguard	
measures.		
	
Council of Europe Recommendation on Profiling 
	 	
The	Council	of	Europe	Recommendation	on	Profiling	provides	a	significantly	
more	 detailed	 regulatory	 solution	 for	 profiling	 than	 the	 Data	 Protection	
Directive.	The	Recommendation,	the	first	 international	attempt	at	regulating	
profiling,	 is	 meant	 as	 an	 application	 of	 data	 protection	 principles	 from	
Convention	 108	 to	 profiling.14	It	 does	 not	 have	 a	 binding	 effect	 but	 can	 be	
considered	soft	law	directed	at	all	states	which	have	adopted	Convention	108.		
	
The	 preamble	 to	 the	 Recommendation	 lists	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 for	 its	
adoption.	Nevertheless,	a	closer	look	demonstrates	that	the	authors’	primary	
worries	were	the	following.	First,	profiles,	when	they	are	attributed	to	a	data	
subject,	make	it	possible	to	generate	new	personal	data	which	are	not	those	
which	 the	data	subject	has	communicated	 to	 the	controller	or	which	can	be	
presumed	to	be	known	to	the	controller.	This	is	a	justified	fear,	especially	in	
light	of	the	increasing	data	aggregation	practices	the	sole	purpose	of	which	is	
to	 augment	 the	 value	 of	 the	 communicated	 data	 by	way	 of	 connecting	 it	 to	
other	 data.	 The	 second	 prominent	worry	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 that	 the	
individual	is	being	profiled,	the	lack	of	transparency	and	the	lack	of	accuracy.	
This	 fear	 is	also	 justified	as	the	user	often	has	 little	or	no	control	over	what	
happens	 to	 data	 after	 he	 gives	 consent	 to	 its	 processing.	 The	 subsequent	
profiling	 may,	 therefore,	 continue	 without	 his	 knowledge	 and	 the	 original	
data	may	be	degraded	as	they	are	combined	with	older	or	less	accurate	data	
or	 even	 data	 relating	 to	 a	 completely	 different	 individual.	 	 The	 final	worry	
relates	 to	children	whose	profiling	may	have	serious	consequences	 for	 their	
																																																								
13	Council	 Framework	 Decision	 2008/977/JHA	 of	 27	 November	 2008	 on	 the	 protection	 of	
personal	 data	 processed	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 police	 and	 judicial	 cooperation	 in	 criminal	
matters,	OJ	L	350,	30.12.2008,	page	60	
14	Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Individuals	 with	 regard	 to	 Automatic	 Processing	 of	
Personal	Data,	Strasbourg,	28.I.1981	
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subsequent	lives.	Since	children	are	not	in	the	position	to	give	consent,	special	
protection	measures	need	to	be	applied.	
	
The	Recommendation	 does	make	 the	 important	 distinction	 between	profile	
generation	 and	profile	application.	Article	1(d)	defines	a	“profile”	as	a	set	of	
data	 characterising	 an	 individual	 which	 is	 meant	 for	 “applying”	 to	 an	
individual.	Furthermore,	 in	Article	1(e)	“profiling”	 is	defined	as	applying	the	
profile	 to	 an	 individual.	 The	 choice	 of	 words	 is	 somewhat	 unfortunate	 as	
profiling	 is	 often	 understood	 elsewhere	 as	 only	 the	 process	 of	 gathering	
information	not	the	process	of	applying	it.	Elsewhere	in	the	text,	however,	the	
recommendation	 does	 not	 have	 two	 different	 regimes	 for	 profile	 collection	
and	profile	application.	
	
Section	3	contains	detailed	conditions	for	collection.		Article	3.1	provides	that	
collection	and	processing	must	be	“fair,	lawful	and	proportionate”	and	that	it	
must	 be	 for	 “specific	 and	 legitimate”	 purposes.	 The	 requirement	 that	
purposes	should	be	specific	is	unrealistic.	Modern	profiles	are	often	collected	
without	specific	purpose	 in	mind	or	 the	purpose	may	become	apparent	at	a	
later	 stage.	 Facebook	 “like”	 button,	 for	 example,	 was	 originally	 introduces	
without	 commercial	 purposes	 but	 these	 have	 subsequently	 been	
experimented	 with.	 Condition	 3.2	 demands	 that	 profiling	 be	 “adequate,	
relevant	and	not	excessive”		in	relation	to	the	purposes.	
	
Collection	 and	 processing	 can	 be	 allowed	 in	 two	 situations	 only.	 The	 first	
(Article	 3.4.a)	 is	 where	 they	 are	 provided	 for	 by	 law.	 This	 should	 be	
interpreted	 to	mean	where	 they	 are	demanded	 by	 law,	 i.e.	where	 a	 specific	
provision	 calls	 for	 profiling.	 In	 this	 case,	 no	 further	 conditions	 need	 be	
fulfilled.	This	will	often	be	the	case	in	laws	involving	administrative	situations	
(ID	cards	and	numbers,	passports,	insurance,	police	records,	etc.)	The	second	
situation	(Article	3.4.b)	is	where	they	are	permitted	by	law	and	one	of	the	five	
preconditions	are	met.	The	words	permitted	should	here	understood	to	mean	
that	the	purpose	for	the	collection	must	not	be	illegal	according	to	local	law.		
	
The	 first	 precondition	 for	 permitted	 collection	 and	 processing	 is	 a	 “free,	
specific	 and	 informed	 consent”.	 This	 is	 a	 big	 advance	 over	 the	 solution	
currently	 given	 in	 Article	 15	 of	 the	 Data	 Protection	 Directive.	 The	
Recommendation	demands	a	consent	that	specifically	relates	to	profiling	–	a	
general	 consent	 given	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ordinary	 data	 processing	 is	 not	
sufficient.	 Moreover,	 the	 consent	 must	 be	 “informed”,	 meaning	 that	 data	
subject	must	be	aware	 that	data	will	be	used	 for	profiling	and	not	 for	other	
purposes,	 however	 legitimate	 they	may	be.	The	 second	precondition	 covers	
performance	 of	 a	 contract	 and	 implementation	 of	 precontractual	 measures	
taken	 at	 data	 subject’s	 request.	 An	 example	 can	 be	 found	 in	 any	web	 store	
account	used	today.	The	third	precondition	relates	to	tasks	carried	out	“in	the	
public	interest”	or	“in	the	exercise	of	official	authority”.	The	authority	may	be	
vested	 either	 in	 the	 controller	 or	 in	 a	 third	 party.	 The	 fourth	 precondition	
exists	where	the	controller’s	or	the	third	party’s	legitimate	interests	demand	
profiling.	 This	 can	 be	 overridden	 in	 the	 situation	where	 data	 subject’s	 own	
fundamental	rights	are	at	stake.	The	final	precondition	exists	where	the	“vital	
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interests	 if	 the	 data	 subject”	 demand	 it.	 	 Profiling	 of	 persons	 incapable	 of	
demonstrating	their	own	free	consent	 is	allowed	only	when	protecting	their	
own	interest	(Article	3.5).	
	
The	 Recommendation	 shows	 acute	 awareness	 of	 one	 of	 the	 most	 common	
sources	 of	 profiling	 today	 –	 commercial	 profiling.	 In	 Article	 3.7	 it	 demands	
that	 “as	 much	 as	 possible”,	 it	 should	 be	 able	 to	 access	 information	 about	
goods	and	services	or	access	goods	or	services	themselves	without	disclosing	
personal	 information,	 The	 article	 demands	 that	 providers	 of	 information	
society	 services	 (and	 this	 includes	 strictly	 commercial	 but	 also	 non‐
commercial	 or	 hybrid	 websites)	 should	 provide	 by	 default	 non‐profiled	
access	to	their	information.	Sensitive	data	are	the	subject	of	a	separate	entry	
in	 Section	 C	 (Article	 3.11).	 The	 default	 position	 here	 is	 the	 prohibition	 of	
profiling	except	where	necessary	for	the	“lawful	and	specific	purposes”	in	the	
presence	of	adequate	domestic	safeguards.	
	
In	 the	 course	 of	 profiling,	 the	 controller	 must	 provide	 the	 subject	 with	 a	
number	 of	 predetermined	 pieces	 of	 information	 (Article	 4.1).	When	 data	 is	
collected	directly	 from	 the	 subject	 (and	not	 transferred	 from	a	 third	party),	
this	information	needs	to	be	given	at	the	time	of	collection	at	the	latest.	The	
subjects	need	to	be	told	that	data	will	be	used	for	profiling	and	need	to	know	
the	purpose	of	profiling	and	 the	categories	of	personal	data.	The	 identity	of	
the	controller	must	be	disclosed	as	well	as	the	fact	that	safeguards	exist.		
	
A	separate	category	(4.1.f)	is	designed	to	demonstrate	the	fairness	of	profiling	
to	the	subject.	The	subsequent	list	is	given	as	a	way	of	example.	This	includes	
the	persons	to	whom	data	may	be	communicated,	the	possibility	to	refuse	to	
give	consent	or	to	withdraw	it	subsequently,	the	right	to	object	to	or	demand	
correction	and	others.		
	
Of	particular	 interest	here	 is	 the	 “envisaged	effects	of	 the	 attribution	of	 the	
profile	to	the	data	subject”	which	means	that	the	data	subject	needs	to	learn	
not	only	about	the	fact	that	profiles	are	created	about	him	or	her	but	also	the	
possible	implications	of	these	profiles	being	applied.		
	
The	fact	that	data	is	not	collected	from	the	data	subject	but	obtained	from	the	
third	 party	 (by	 way	 of	 purchase,	 for	 example)	 does	 not	 exonerate	 the	
controller	 from	providing	 the	 information	 to	 the	data	 subject	 at	 the	 time	of	
transfer	 (i.e.	when	 the	 controller	 receives	 the	data).	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	note	
that	Article	4.4	 is	 aware	 that	data	 is	 often	not	 collected	 for	 the	purposes	of	
profiling	 but	 only	 become	 its	 subject	 later.	 The	 obligation	 to	 inform	 arising	
out	of	Article	4.1	is	then	extended	to	such	a	situation.		
	
Data	subjects	have	the	right,	according	to	Article	5.1	to	 learn	not	only	about	
the	fact	that	they	are	being	profiled	but	also	the	logic	underlying	the	profiling.	
They	are	entitled	to	correction,	deletion	or	blocking	only	in	the	cases	where	
profiling	 is	 performed	 contrary	 to	 domestic	 law.	 The	 right	 to	 correction,	
deletion	 or	 blocking	 does	 not	 exist	 purely	 because	 the	 data	 subject	 had	
changed	its	mind	about	the	profiling.	A	separate	right	of	objection	is	inserted	
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in	 Article	 5.3	 which	 entitles	 the	 data	 subject	 to	 complain	 on	 “compelling	
legitimate	grounds”.		
	
Regulation Proposal 
	
The	current	data	protection	regime	is	almost	20	years	old.	A	need	for	reform	
was	recognized	and	a	new	proposal	saw	light	in	2012.	The	new	Regulation	is	
meant	as	a	shift	from	bureaucratic	requirements	to	compliance	in	practice.15	
	
The	 Regulation	 has	 a	 significantly	 more	 coherent	 protection	 of	 profiling.	
Recital	 24	 recognizes	 the	 danger	 of	 online	 identifiers	 such	 as	 cookies	 or	 IP	
numbers	which	 their	 “devices,	 applications,	 tools	 and	 protocols”	may	 leave	
behind.	 This,	 combined	 with	 unique	 identifiers	 and	 other	 information	 may	
lead	 to	 profile	 creation.	 The	 Commission	 concludes,	 however,	 that	
identification	 numbers,	 location	 data,	 online	 identifiers	 or	 other	 specific	
factors	are	not	personal	data	as	such.	 It	 is	puzzling	why	this	conclusion	had	
been	 reached	 as	 this	 data	 is	 not	 anonymous	by	default.	On	 the	 contrary,	 IP	
numbers	and	cookies	are	by	default	connected	to	particular	machines	which	
are	,	more	often	than	not,	accessed	by	particular	users.	Amendment	15	of	the	
Albrecht	Report	(see	below,	note	25)	changes	the	text,	saying	that	the	default	
position	 is	Regulation	application	 “unless	 those	 identifiers	demonstrably	do	
no	 relate	 to	 natural	 persons”,	 giving	 as	 a	 way	 of	 example	 company	 IP	
addresses.		
	
The	main	 provision	 on	 profiling,	 Article	 20,	 is	 entitled	 “Measures	 based	 on	
profiling”.	This	may	suggest	that	the	article	is	only	regulating	decision	making	
based	 on	 profiles	 and	 not	 the	 actual	 profile	 creation.	 The	 word	 “decision”,	
however,	 prominently	 featuring	 in	 Article	 15	 of	 the	 Directive	 has	 been	
removed.	This	has	to	be	interpreted	to	mean	that	the	new	regime	applies	to	
profile	 creation	 as	well	 as	 to	 decision	making,	 automatic	 or	 other,	 resulting	
from	the	application	of	the	profile	to	an	individual.16	Another	difference	from	
the	 Directive	 is	 that	 “natural	 person”	 replaces	 the	 “data	 subject”.	 This	 is	 a	
significant	change.	In	the	Directive	Article	2,	a	“data	subject”	is	“an	identified	
or	 identifiable	 natural	 person”.	 The	 fact	 that	 Regulation	 would	 apply	 to	
natural	person	means	that	profiling	is	covered	in	the	Regulation,	in	principle	
at	least,	irrespective	of	whether	the	data	is	anonymized	or	not.		
	
Recital	 58	 outlines	 the	 bases	 for	 lawful	 profiling.	 Such	 measure	 should	 be	
allowed	 when	 expressly	 authorised	 by	 law	 (and	 proper	 safeguards	 exist),	
when	it	is	carried	out	in	the	course	of	entering	or	performance	of	a	contract,	
or	 when	 the	 data	 subject	 has	 given	 his	 consent.	 These	 requirements	 are	
																																																								
15	See	Christopher	Kuner.	”The	European	Commission’s	Proposed	Data	Protection	Regulation:	
A	Copernican	Revolution	 in	European	Data	Protection	Law”.	Privacy	&	Security	Law	Report,	
11	(2012):	6	
16	See	Mathias	Vermeulen,	.	“Regulating	Profiling	in	the	European	Data	Protection	Regulation:	
An	Interim	Insight	into	the	Drafting	of	Article	20”.	EMSOC	Working	Paper.	Available	at	SSRN:	
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2382787	 or	 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382787	 accessed	
28.2.2014.	
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repeated	in	Article	4(8)	of	the	main	body	of	the	Regulation	(as	is	also	the	case	
in	Recommendation).		
	
Article	 20	 applies	 to	 measures	 which	 produce	 legal	 effect	 or	 which	
“significantly	affect”	natural	persons.	The	measures	must	be	“based	solely	on	
automated	processing”	 and	 “intended	 to	 evaluate	 certain	 personal	 aspects”.	
This	part	is	worded	in	the	same	manner	as	the	Directive.	The	first	addition	is	
that	the	measure	may	also	be	intended	“to	analyse	or	predict”	various	factors.	
This	is	a	small	but	important	clarification	of	how	profiles	may	be	applied.	By	
way	 of	 example,	 performance	 at	work,	 economic	 situation,	 location,	 health,	
personal	 preferences,	 reliability	 and	 behaviour	 are	 quoted.	 It	 will	 be	
recollected	that	 the	Directive	only	provided	three	examples:	performance	at	
work,	creditworthiness,	reliability	and	conduct.		
	
Paragraph	2	allows	profiling	in	the	course	of	conclusion	or	performance	of	a	
contract,	where	 it	 is	expressly	authorized	either	by	EU	or	national	 law	or	 is	
based	 on	 consent.	 The	 latter	 provision	 points	 to	 new	Article	 7	which	 is	 an	
updated	and	more	precise	definition	of	consent.	That	article	demands	that	the	
controller	bears	the	burden	of	proof.	Paragraph	2	furthermore	demands	that	
consent	which	is	in	a	written	declaration	containing	other	matters	(e.g.	‘terms	
of	use’)	be	distinguishable.	Consent	can	be	withdrawn,	which	has	the	effect	of	
making	processing	unlawful	from	the	moment	of	withdrawal	but	not	before.	
Consent	 is	 not	 a	 valid	 basis	where	 there	 is	 an	 imbalance	 between	 the	 data	
subject	and	the	data	controller.		
	
Article	4(8)	of	the	proposal	defines	consent	as	“freely	given	specific,	informed	
and	 explicit	 indication”.	 This	 indication	 can	 be	 given	 by	 a	 statement	 or	
affirmative	 action.	 Article	 4(8)	 is	 an	 improvement	 on	 the	 situation	 in	 the	
Directive.	 FP7	 CONSENT	 project,	 looking	 into	 consent	 and	 privacy	 on	 user‐
generated	 websites,	 demonstrated17	that	 users	 often	 give	 consent	 lightly,	
without	properly	understanding	its	implications.	The	most	common	situation	
is	where	an	individual	is	presented	with	lengthy	‘privacy	policy’	or	‘terms	and	
conditions’.	The	users	are	unlikely	to	read	those	due	to	their	length	or	the	fact	
that	 they	 change	 frequently.	 Even	 popular	 sites	 like	 Facebook,	 which	 have	
simplified	 both	 their	 privacy	 policies	 and	 terms	 of	 use,	 prove	 complicated.	
Facebook	 “Data	 use	 policy”18	lists	 six	 different	 headings.	 Among	 these	 are	
titles	 “Information	 we	 receive	 and	 how	 it	 is	 used”,	 “Other	 websites	 and	
applications”	and	“Cookies,	pixels	and	other	similar	technologies”	all	of	which	
relate	to	profiling	to	larger	or	smaller	effect.	In	addition	to	this,	there	exists	a	
separate	“Privacy	Page”,19	“Safety	Page”20	and	“Minors	and	Safety”	page.	All	of	
this	 is	 in	 addition	 to	 what	 the	 site	 calls	 “Complete	 Data	 Use	 Policy”.21	It	 is	
submitted	that	an	average	user	is	not	capable	of	making	an	informed	decision	
																																																								
17	CONSENT	Project,	see	footnote	5.	In	particular	work	packages	3	(privacy	polices)	and	7	and	
8	(quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis).	
18	https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/	accessed	28.2.2014.	
19	https://www.facebook.com/fbprivacy		
20	https://www.facebook.com/safety		
21	https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy		
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about	profiling	 in	 the	situation	described	here.	Similar	conditions	are	 found	
on	other	websites.		
	
In	light	of	the	foregoing,	Article	4(8)	is	a	step	forward.	The	consent	required	
there,	coupled	with	the	clarification	of	Article	20	can	be	interpreted	to	mean	
that	consent	regarding	profiling	and	automated	data	processing	needs	to	be	
obtained	separately.	Nevertheless,	it	would	have	been	better	had	the	solution	
in	the	Recommendation	been	adopted	where	consent	is	specifically	related	to	
profiling.22	
	
An	 important	 addition	 to	 the	 old	 regime	 is	 paragraph	 3,	 which	 says	 that	
decisions	 cannot	be	made	 solely	on	Article	9.	This	article	deals	with	 special	
categories	of	data	 (racial,	 ethnic,	political,	 religious,	 trade	union‐related	and	
others).	 If	 a	 commercial	 entity	 engages	 in,	 for	 example,	 racial	 profiling,	
assigning	their	clients	into	groups	based	on	racial	criteria	would	be	illegal.		
	
Reaction, Albrecht Report and Proposed Amendments  
	
	
The	 business	 communities	 reacted	 aversely	 to	 the	 proposal	 believing	 that	
extra	 burden	 is	 being	 placed	 on	 them.23	In	 particular	 they	 objected	 to	
potential	 requirement	 to	 consent	 to	 cookies,	 the	 potential	 to	 apply	 the	
proposed	Regulation	to	behavioural	advertising	and	to	consent	as	a	basis	 in	
general.24	They	 emphasized	 that	 comprehensive	 and	 wide‐ranging	 clause	
would	 not	 be	 risk‐based	 and	 would	 unduly	 restrict	 a	 number	 of	 useful	
practices.	Some	of	the	criticism	is	directed	at	the	individualized/anonymized	
dichotomy	which	the	Regulation	operates	on	but	which	does	not	necessarily	
coincide	with	the	reality.		
	
The	Opinion	of	 the	Committee	on	Industry,	Research	and	Energy25	proposes	
through	Amendment	182	a	new	industry	friendly	solution	which	would	apply	
to	 “advertising,	market	 research	 or	 tailoring	 telemedia”.	 In	 such	 cases,	 user	
profiles	can	be	created	using	pseudonymised	data,	in	cases	where	the	person	
concerned	 does	 not	 object.	 To	 make	 sure	 that	 problems	 do	 not	 arise,	 the	
amendment	suggest	that	user	profiles	may	not	be	combined	with	data	about	
the	bearer	of	the	pseudonym.	
	
Article	 29	 WP,	 consisting	 from	 EU	 data	 protection	 authorities,	 suggested,	
contrary	to	the	industry	views	summarized	above,	that	the	Regulation	could	
do	more	 to	 protect	 individuals	 against	 profiling.	 It	 objected	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
stronger	differentiation	had	not	been	made	between	the	collection	of	data	for	
																																																								
22	See	Article	3.6	
23	UK	House	of	Commons	Justice	Committee,	The	Committee's	opinion	on	the	European	Data	
Protection	Framework	proposals.	Volume	II,	Additional	Written	Evidence,	September	2012.	
Written	evidence	from	the	Advertising	Association,	Ev	w28.	13.1	–	13.2.	
24	See	Mathias	Vermeulen,	op.	cit.	p.	11‐12	
25	26.2.2013.	COM(2012)0011	–	C7‐0025/2012	–	2012/0011(COD))	
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the	purposes	of	profiling	on	one	hand	and	the	creation	of	profiles	as	such.26	
The	Working	Party	suggested	that	provisions	ensuring	greater	transparency	
and	control	for	data	subjects	be	introduced.		
	
In	a	somewhat	similar	line	but	producing	a	more	detailed	revision,	the	main	
rapporteur	 for	 the	 Regulation,	 Jan	 Albrecht,	 proposed	 significant	
amendments	that	change	the	picture	of	the	Proposal.27		
	
In	respect	of	controllers	not	established	in	the	Union,	the	Regulation	proposes	
its	 application	 in	 Article	 3	 to	 such	 controllers	 where	 they	 offer	 goods	 or	
services	 to	 data	 subjects	 in	 the	 EU	 or	where	 they	monitor	 their	 behaviour.	
Albrecht	 Amendment	 83	 recommends	 that	 monitoring	 of	 behaviour	 be	
replaced	with	monitoring	of	data	subjects.	This	is	widening	of	the	scope	of	the	
Regulation’s	application	as	monitoring	of	subjects	may	not	simultaneously	be	
monitoring	of	their	behaviour.28	A	data	subject	becomes,	in	Amendment	84,	a	
person	who	can	be	singled	out	alone	or	“in	combination	with	associated	data.”		
	
The	 Albrecht	 Report	 changes	 the	 article	 structurally,	 moving	 definition	 to	
Article	 4	 (Amendment	 87)	 and	 information	 requirements	 to	 Article	 14	
(Amendments	 130‐132).	 It	 streamlines	 and	 tightens	 the	 requirements	 for	
lawful	 profiling.	 The	 title	 is	 changed	 from	 “Measures	 based	 on	 profiling”	 to	
“Profiling”	signifying	that	the	regime	applies	to	profile	generation	as	well	as	to	
decision	making	 based	 on	 profiles.	 It	 adds	 a	 new	 and	 significant	 paragraph	
2(a)	which	says	that:	
	
Profiling	that	has	the	effect	of	discriminating	against	individuals	on	the	basis	of	race	or	
ethnic	 origin,	 political	 opinions,	 religion	 or	 beliefs,	 trade	 union	membership,	 sexual	
orientation	or	gender	identity,	or	that	results	in	measures	which	have	such	effect,	shall	
be	prohibited.	
	
The	Albrecht	Report	has	as	a	basis	four	important	principles.	The	first	is	that	
monitoring	of	data	 in	 the	 sense	of	Article	3	 (as	 amended)	would	 take	place	
depending	 on	 how	 comprehensive	 the	 tracing	 efforts	were.29	Offline	 use	 or	
sporadic	aggregation	would	not	be	considered	monitoring.	Second,	protection	
would	apply	to	information	concerning	an	identified	or	identifiable	person.30	
If	data	cannot	be	related	in	any	way	to	such	a	person,	the	Regulation	would	
not	apply.	Third,	processing	relating	to	identifiers	which	leave	traces	should	
be	 covered	 by	 Regulation.31	Fourth,	 consent	 is	 only	 valid	 where	 the	 choice	
made	is	genuinely	free	and	valid.32		
	
																																																								
26	See	note	4	above,	p.	3	
27	Jan	Albrecht,	Draft	Report	on	the	proposal	for	a	regulation	of	the	European	Parliament	and	
of	the	Council	on	the	protection	of	individual	with	regard	to	the	processing	of	personal	data	
and	 on	 the	 free	 movement	 of	 such	 data	 (General	 Data	 Protection	 Regulation)	 (COM	
(2012)0011	 –	 C7	 ‐	 0025/2012	 –	 2012/0011	 (COD)).	 European	 Parliament,	 Committee	 on	
civil	liberties,	justice	and	home	affairs.	17	December	2012.	
28	For	example,	ID	numbers,	photos	and	voice	samples	are	normally	not	behaviour‐related	
29	Item	21	
30	Item	23	
31	Item	24	
32	Item	33	
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It	is	worth	adding	here	that	the	Report	created	a	category	of	“pseudonymous	
data.”	This	category,	introduced	in	Amendment	105	which	modifies	Article	7	
on	consent	by	adding	a	new	paragraph	–	2a,	is	subject	to	less	strict	treatment.	
The	 article	 provides	 that	 data	 which	 is	 processed	 only	 in	 the	 form	 of	
pseudonyms	allows	consent	“by	automated	means	using	a	technical	standard	
with	general	validity	in	the	Union.”		
Concluding Remarks 
	
While	a	reader	may	quickly	agree	with	the	idea	that	profiling	and	automated	
decision	making	are	widespread	and	 important,	 it	 is	more	difficult	 to	 reach	
generalized	conclusions	concerning	any	future	direction	in	which	law	should	
move.		Whereas	it	may	be	tempting	to	look	at	the	situation	in	black	or	white,	
depending	on	whether	one	stands	on	the	industry	or	the	user	side,	we	believe	
the	 reality	 to	 be	 somewhat	 more	 complex.	 Three	 general	 conclusion	 may	
nevertheless	be	drawn:	
	
First,	while	the	existence	of	protection	in	the	present	regime	is	positive,	it	is	
equally	true	that	current	laws	are	in	need	of	change.	The	present	regime	has	
simply	 become	 too	 dated	 for	 the	modern	 realities	 of	 big	 data,	 data	mining,	
data	 aggregation,	 profiling	 and	 automated	 decision	 making.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	future	profiling	and	automated	decision	need	to	be	regulated	carefully.		
National	 data	 protection	 authorities	 (represented	 in	 Article	 29	 WP)	 have	
sometimes	radically	different	solutions	than	those	offered	by	the	industry	or	
the	Commission.	It	is	a	misapprehension	to	believe	that	these	differences	can	
be	 overcome	 without	 a	 constructive	 political	 dialogue	 or	 by	 strong‐arm	
tactics.	 In	 that	 sense,	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 Recommendation	 should	 be	 a	
welcome	and	useful	instrument	for	the	European	lawmakers.		
	
Second,	there	is	no	doubt	that	regulatory	models	in	Europe	and	in	the	United	
States	 are	 different.	 The	 United	 States	 have	 traditionally	 been	 more	
“parsimonious”	 while	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 more	 proactive.33	It	 is	 illusory,	
however,	 to	 believe	 that	 solutions	 which	 are	 more	 widely	 accepted	 by	 the	
industry	while	granting	significant	individual	rights	can	be	achieved	without	a	
long‐lasting	and	effective	transatlantic	dialogue.		
	
Third,	 data	 mining	 and	 big	 data	 have	 led	 to	 creation	 of	 an	 information	
environment	 that	 brings	many	 advantages	 to	modern	 users.	 Ignoring	 these	
advantages	 is	dangerous.	At	the	same	time	it	brings	the	risk	of	 invasion	and	
discrimination.	Ignoring	these	is	equally	dangerous.	Having	this	ambiguity	in	
mind,	Custers	and	others	have	suggested	that	a	priori	limiting	measures	such	
as	 access	 controls,	 anonymity	 and	 purpose	 specification	 are	 increasingly	
failing	in	the	fight	against	privacy	violation	and	discrimination	and	argued	for	
a	 focus	 on	a	posteriori	 accountability	 and	 transparency.34	While	 these	 ideas	
are	yet	to	be	tested,	it	is	possible	to	say	that	lawmaking	alone	will	not	give	the	
																																																								
33	See			Schwartz.,	Paul.	M.	“The	E.U.‐U.S.	Privacy	Collision:	A	Turn	to	Institutions	and	
Procedures”	126	(2013)	Harvard	Law	Review	1966		
34	Bart	Custers,	et	al.	(eds.)	Discrimination	and	Privacy	in	the	Information	Society.	Data	Mining	
and	Profiling	in	Large	Databases	(Berlin:	Springer,	2013),	p.	342	
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answer	 and	 that	 traditional	 lawmaking,	 in	 particular,	 may	 have	 to	 be	
complemented	by	modern	and	less	traditional	approaches.		
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